Perceived Importance of Information: The Effects of Mentioning Information, Shared Information Bias, Ownership Bias, Reiteration, and Confirmation Bias by Swol, Lyn M. van
www.ssoar.info
Perceived Importance of Information: The Effects of
Mentioning Information, Shared Information Bias,
Ownership Bias, Reiteration, and Confirmation Bias
Swol, Lyn M. van
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Swol, L. M. v. (2007). Perceived Importance of Information: The Effects of Mentioning Information, Shared Information
Bias, Ownership Bias, Reiteration, and Confirmation Bias. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10(2), 239-256.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430207074730
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-228227
Group Processes &
Intergroup Relations
2007 Vol 10(2) 239–256
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Participants were given information for and against the decriminalization of marijuana and 
discussed the issue in groups. Factors affecting rated importance of information after the 
group discussion were examined. Participants did not rate information that was mentioned 
during the discussion as more important than information not mentioned, and participants did 
not rate shared information they mentioned as more important than unshared information. 
Participants did rate shared information other group members mentioned as more important 
than unshared information others mentioned. Participants did not rate their own information 
as more important than other’s information, and information that was repeated was not rated 
as more important. Participants did perceive information supporting their individual position as 
more important than information against their position, and this confi rmation bias was lessened 
in groups containing an opinion minority. A comparison of minority and majority members in 
minority-containing groups found that minority members were more open to information than 
majority members. 
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Groups are often used to make policy decisions 
about controversial issues because the diver-
sity of opinions and information in a group 
is assumed to increase the consideration of 
many different viewpoints (Gruenfeld, Mannix, 
Williams, & Neale, 1996; Surowiecki, 2004). 
However, research has found that group mem-
bers often fail to discuss information unique 
to individual members (Wittenbaum & Stasser, 
1996) or consider information contrary to their 
opinions (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & 
Moscovici, 2000). One reason group members 
fail to consider unique information and infor-
mation contrary to their opinion is that group 
members may weight this information as less 
important than information known to all group 
members and information supporting their 
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opinion (Chernyshenko, Miner, Baumann, & 
Sniezek, 2003; Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 
2003). This article examines how several factors 
infl uence the importance that people assign to 
information after discussing it in a group. Speci-
fi cally, it is examined whether participants have 
an ownership bias toward rating information 
they know before the group discussion as more 
important than information learned from other 
group members, whether participants rate 
information that is mentioned and information 
that is repeated as more important, whether 
participants have a bias for shared information, 
and whether participants have a confi rmation 
bias toward rating information supporting their 
opinion as more important than information 
against their opinion. Further, it is examined 
if the presence of an opinion minority reduces 
this confi rmation bias.
Bias for shared information
Many researchers have found that groups dis-
cuss information that is known to and shared by 
all group members before the discussion more 
than information that is unshared and known 
to only one group member (e.g. Cruz, Boster, 
& Rodriguez, 1997; Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 
1997; Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Henningsen & 
Henningsen, 2003; Hollingshead, 1996a, 1996b; 
Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; 
Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998; Larson, 
Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994; Savadori, Van 
Swol, & Sniezek, 2001; Schittekatte & Van Hiel, 
1996; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stasser, Stewart, & 
Wittenbaum, 1995; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 
1989; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987; Stewart, 
1998; Stewart, Billings & Stasser, 1998; Stewart 
& Stasser, 1995; Van Hiel & Schittekate, 1998; 
Wittenbaum, 1998). Further, once mentioned, 
shared information tends to be repeated more 
than unshared information (Larson et al., 1994, 
1996; Savadori et al., 2001; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; 
Stasser et al., 1989, 1995; Wittenbaum, 1998). 
Wittenbaum and Stasser (1996) call this focus 
on shared information in groups the common 
information sampling bias. Researchers have 
examined many hypotheses for this bias. 
Statistically, information is more likely to be 
mentioned when it is shared because more group 
members can mention it (Stasser & Titus, 1985; 
Tindale & Kameda, 2000). At the group level, 
Gigone and Hastie (1993, 1997) have investigated 
how shared information has a larger impact on 
individuals’ pre-group opinions, and therefore, 
is mentioned more often as group members 
defend their opinion during the course of the 
discussion and as these pre-group opinions 
infl uence the group’s fi nal decision. 
 Other researchers have investigated processes 
at the individual level, examining why individuals 
assign greater importance to shared information 
than unshared information (Chernyshenko et al., 
2003; Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; Van 
Swol, Savadori, & Sniezek, 2003). Specifi cally, Van 
Swol et al. (2003) examined how the ownership 
of information before the group discussion and 
the repetition of information can increase its 
importance to individuals. Greitemeyer and 
Schulz-Hardt (2003) examined how information 
supporting an individual’s initial opinion is rated 
as more important. Chernyshenko et al. (2003) 
examined three characteristics that can increase 
the importance of information: whether it is 
common or unique, whether it is owned or not 
owned, and whether it is mentioned. This article 
examines how these factors affect how individuals 
rate the importance of information after a group 
discussion of a controversial issue.
Common information sampling bias 
and mentioning of information
Chernyshenko et al. (2003) predicted that infor-
mation group members mention should be rated 
as more important than undiscussed information. 
They proposed that information increases in 
importance in a process called ‘commitment 
enhancement’ when it is mentioned because 
the act of mentioning a piece of information 
causes the information to increase in salience 
and validity. Further, information that is men-
tioned is often privately rehearsed before 
mentioning it and is more easily recalled. Un-
discussed information, however, becomes less 
important because it becomes less salient and 
the fact that it is not discussed may be taken as 
a sign of the unimportance of the information 
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(Chernyshenko et al., 2003). Therefore, I predict 
that information that is mentioned should be 
rated as more important than information that 
is not mentioned (Hypothesis 1).
 However, once mentioned group members 
react to shared information more positively 
than unshared. Wittenbaum, Hubbell, and 
Zuckerman (1999) found that unshared infor-
mation was not as highly regarded by members 
as shared information and that those who 
communicated more unshared information were 
viewed as less task competent than those who com-
municated more shared information. Shared 
information is socially validating (Wittenbaum & 
Bowman, 2004) in that it confi rms the accuracy 
and importance of one’s information compared 
to others. Wittenbaum, et al. (1999) proposed that 
shared information enhances group members’ 
evaluations of their knowledge and reinforces 
what members already know in a process they 
called mutual enhancement: ‘a process whereby 
group members develop enhanced evaluations 
of each other’s task capabilities when shared 
information is mentioned’ (p. 5). Because 
shared information is mutually validating, group 
members react to the contributor of shared 
information with encouragement and positive 
evaluations, further enhancing the contributor’s 
assessment of the information. However, the 
contributor of unshared information is often 
met with a lack of social validation. In addition to 
being mutually enhancing, shared information 
is familiar and easily validated (Parks & Cowlin, 
1996), increasing the likelihood participants will 
react positively to it when it is mentioned. There-
fore, whereas shared and unshared information 
should be rated about equally when undiscussed, 
shared information should be rated as more 
important than unshared when it is discussed 
(Hypothesis 2).
Ownership bias 
Chernyshenko et al. (2003) make a distinction 
between unshared information that group 
members know before the group discussion 
(own unshared) and unshared information 
they learn from other group members during 
the course of discussion (other unshared). 
Van Swol et al. (2003) found that participants 
had an ownership bias toward rating information 
they received before the group discussion 
(shared and own unshared) as more valid and 
familiar than information not received (other 
unshared). This ownership bias could contribute 
to the common information sampling bias 
because shared information is owned by all 
members, and therefore, more highly valued by 
all group members. Chernyshenko et al. (2003) 
found that participants rated shared informa-
tion and own unshared information that had 
been discussed as equally important, but rated 
both as more important than others’ unshared 
information. They stated: ‘The simple distinc-
tion between common (shared) and unique 
(unshared) information is insufficient for 
understanding individual members’ judgment 
processes’ (p. 22). Chernyshenko et al. (2003) 
speculated that group members may not always 
hear or process other’s information because they 
are busy concentrating on what they themselves 
are going to contribute to the group discussion. 
Further, even if the other’s unshared information 
is heard, people tend to believe themselves more 
than others (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, &
Vrendenburg, 1995), value that which has been 
given to them more highly than that given to 
another person (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1991), and value their own judgment and infor-
mation more than that of another (Van Swol 
& Sniezek, 2002; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). 
Therefore, I hypothesize participants will have 
an ownership bias, and group members will 
rate information they learned before the group 
discussion (shared and own unshared) as more 
important than information only other group 
members knew (other unshared) before the 
discussion (Hypothesis 3).
Reiteration 
Van Swol et al. (2003) examined how the repe-
tition of shared information can prevent groups 
from uncovering hidden profi les. Research exam-
ining the bias for shared information in groups 
has often used a hidden profi le (Brodbeck, 
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 
2002; Dennis, 1996; Hollingshead, 1996a; 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(2)
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Savadori et al., 2001; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; 
Stasser et al., 1995; Stasser & Titus, 1985). In 
a hidden profi le, the majority of information 
supports one alternative (superior alternative). 
However, the information is distributed such 
that most of the shared information supports 
the inferior alternative(s), and most of the 
unshared information supports the superior 
alternative. Because each group member re-
ceives all the shared information but only part 
of the unshared information, individuals tend 
to prefer an inferior alternative before meeting 
in the group. In order to uncover the hidden 
superior alternative, it is necessary, but not always 
suffi cient, for the group to discuss the majority 
of the unshared information. However, groups 
generally fail to adequately discuss unshared 
information and uncover hidden profi les.
 Van Swol et al. (2003) had individuals make 
an initial decision in a hidden profi le task after 
receiving a biased individual profi le of infor-
mation. After making this initial decision, Van 
Swol et al. (2003) gave the participants the rest 
of the information. Therefore, individuals had 
access to all the information necessary to detect 
the superior alternative and uncover the hidden 
profi le. However, in the repetition condition, par-
ticipants received the shared information two 
more times after their initial decision. Therefore, 
participants received the rest of the unshared 
information in addition to two more exposures 
to the shared information. In the non-repetition 
condition, participants received only the rest of 
the unshared information. Therefore, in this 
condition, participants had one exposure to 
each piece of information. Van Swol et al. (2003) 
found that participants were much more likely 
to uncover the hidden profi le when the shared 
information was not repeated, even though 
participants in both conditions had access to 
the information needed to uncover the hidden 
profi le. They attributed this result to participants 
assigning more validity and importance to infor-
mation that was repeated. They posited that one 
reason groups weight shared information more 
heavily and fail to uncover hidden profi les is that 
shared information is repeated more often. 
 Other researchers have investigated this 
‘reiteration effect’ (Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & 
Hoffrage, 1997) or ‘validity effect’ (Arkes, 1993; 
Boehm, 1994). Hasher, Goldstein, and Toppino 
(1977) verifi ed that repetition of information 
increases the perception that the information is 
true, valid, and reliable. Repetition may be 
used as a heuristic to the truthfulness of a state-
ment when there are no other indicators of the 
statement’s validity, and this effect of repetition 
is often automatic and uses few cognitive re-
sources (Alba, Chromiak, Hasher, & Attig, 1980; 
Hasher & Chromiak, 1977; Hasher et al., 
1977; Hasher & Zacks, 1984). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that information that is repeated 
during the group discussion will be rated as 
more important than information that is not 
repeated (Hypothesis 4).
Confi rmation bias
Much research has found that people have a 
preference for information that confi rms their 
initial opinion compared to information that 
disconfi rms it (for review see, Frey, 1986). This 
preference is referred to as the confi rmation bias. 
For example, Russo, Medvec, and Meloy (1996) 
found that participants distorted new information 
to favor their preferred alternative. Lord, Ross, 
and Lepper (1979) examined how people process 
information that confi rmed or disconfi rmed 
their opinion on social issues. People rated 
confi rming information as more convincing and 
were more critical of disconfi rming information. 
Schulz-Hardt et al. (2000) found that groups 
displayed a confi rmation bias; groups requested 
more information that supported the initial 
group opinion than information contrary to 
the group opinion. 
 Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) exam-
ined how the confi rmation bias affects how 
information is evaluated in a hidden profi le. 
Because the majority of individuals approach 
the group discussion supporting the inferior 
alternative, Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003)
hypothesized that the failure of groups to un-
cover hidden profi les could be the result of the 
individual level process of group members evalu-
ating information supporting their opinion more 
favorably than information not supporting their 
opinion. Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) 
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simulated a group hidden profi le by giving 
participants an information profi le similar to 
the pre-group information participants receive 
before discussing a hidden profi le in a group. 
Therefore, individuals only received part of the 
‘unshared’ information and generally chose the 
inferior choice. After making their fi rst decision, 
participants individually read a transcript of a 
group discussion in which participants received 
the full set of information. Despite learning all 
the information so that participants had more 
information disconfi rming their initial decision 
than confi rming it, most participants maintained 
their initial, inferior choice. Greitemeyer and 
Schulz-Hardt (2003) found that participants rated 
information supporting their initial opinion as 
more important and that this confi rmation bias 
mediated the failure of individuals to uncover 
hidden profi les. Therefore, participants were 
subject to the confi rmation bias and were unable 
to uncover the hidden profi le after their initial 
choice, even though they were subsequently 
given all the information necessary to uncover 
the superior alternative, because they evaluated 
information supporting their choice as more 
important than information disconfirming 
their choice. Consistent with this research I 
hypothesize that information confirming a 
group member’s opinion will be rated as more 
important than information disconfi rming the 
opinion (Hypothesis 5a).
 However, Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt 
(2003) did not use real interacting groups, and 
they stressed that ‘investigating biased evalu-
ation of discussion content in real group studies 
not only seems necessary . . . but could also lead 
to the identifi cation of conditions under which 
group members are better able to conduct an 
unbiased assessment of the information avail-
able to them’ (p. 337). In the present study, I 
examine how participants rate the importance 
of confi rming and disconfi rming information 
discussed in real, interacting groups. However, 
I also examine how groups containing an 
opinion minority may be ‘better able to conduct 
an unbiased assessment of the information 
available to them’ (p. 337) than groups that 
are in consensus.
 Research examining minority infl uence has 
suggested that different processes may motiv-
ate infl uence from a minority and majority in 
a group (for review see, Meyers, Brashers, & 
Hanner, 2000; Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, 
Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). Specifi cally, 
people may publicly conform to a majority to 
avoid reprimand or ridicule, whereas minority 
infl uence may be more sincere and private 
(Moscovici, 1980). Additionally, a minority opin-
ion may facilitate divergent thinking in the group 
causing group members to consider the issue 
from multiple angles, rather than just comparing 
their view with the majority opinion (De Dreu & 
De Vries, 1996; Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth & Rogers, 
1996). Brodbeck et al. (2002, p. 39) said that, 
‘minority infl uence facilitates open-mindedness 
towards alternative solutions’ so an issue is ana-
lyzed ‘broader and more critically’. Therefore, 
a group containing a minority may be more 
open to new information than groups that are 
in consensus without exposure to a minority 
opinion.
 Schulz-Hardt et al. (2000) found that when 
groups contained an opinion minority they were 
less subject to a confi rmation bias when request-
ing additional information than homogeneous 
groups. They hypothesized that the presence of 
opinion minorities may have encouraged diver-
gent thinking and the consideration of more 
confl icting information. Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, 
and Frey (2002) also found that groups contain-
ing members with heterogeneous opinions 
were less likely to engage in biased information 
seeking than homogeneous groups. They 
found that heterogeneous groups had lower 
confi dence in their decision. They reasoned 
that the presence of confl icting preferences 
could make group members feel that they 
did not accurately evaluate the information, 
thus lowering their confidence. This lower 
confi dence could make group members more 
open to critical examination and confl icting 
information, as group members are uncertain 
about the correctness of their position. Also, 
Propp (1997) found that groups with confl icting 
pre-discussion preferences accepted signifi cantly 
more information compared to groups in 
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consensus. Based on this research I hypothesize 
that groups containing a minority opinion will be 
more open to information, so that information 
that is against a group member’s opinion will be 
rated as more important in groups containing 
a minority than in groups in which everyone is 
in consensus (Hypothesis 5b).
 Although previous research (Chernyshenko 
et al., 2003; Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt, 2003; 
Van Swol et al., 2003) has examined the ideas 
discussed above separately, this is the fi rst study 
to examine all these individual level processes 
together. Further, Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt 
(2003) examined the effects of the confi rmation 
bias on shared information and Van Swol et al. 
(2003) examined the reiteration effect on shared 
information using individuals and not interact-
ing groups. Also, Van Swol et al. (2003) examined 
the ownership bias in groups but did not track 
which information was mentioned and not men-
tioned. The current study builds on that pre-
vious research by examining these individual 
level processes within interacting groups and 
then tracking the amount of discussion of each 
piece of information and how discussing infor-
mation affects its rated importance. However, 
Chernyshenko et al. (2003) did track the discus-
sion of information against its rated importance, 
but did not compare self-contributed shared 
information to other-contributed shared infor-
mation, which I do in this article. Finally, this 
article adds to previous research by using a 
non-fi ctional real life task. Previous research 
examining shared information has often used 
fi ctitious tasks. For example, Chernyshenko et 
al. (2003) and Van Swol et al. (2003) had partici-
pants make decisions about a fi ctitious pharma-
ceutical company. However, this study uses real 
information about a task that participants are 
likely to have a formed opinion about before the 
experiment. Because I use a task in which par-
ticipants are likely to be on one side of the issue 
or another, I am also able to examine the role 
of opinion minorities and the rating of shared 
information. Previous research examining the 
bias for shared information has seldom examined 
the role of minority and majority opinions in 
the process of information exchange.
Method
Participants
Participants (n = 129) were undergraduates from 
a communication studies department at a private 
midwestern university completing the study as 
part of a class requirement. Participants met in 
three person groups (n = 43). In each group, the 
range of opinions toward the decriminalization 
of marijuana was random. Twenty-one of the 
groups had a minority and majority with one 
or two members for the decriminalization of 
marijuana and the remaining member(s) against. 
These were classifi ed as majority/minority groups. 
In 10 groups, all group members shared the 
same opinion toward the decriminalization of 
marijuana. These were classifi ed as consensus 
groups. The remaining 12 groups, the neutral-
containing groups, contained one member who 
rated themselves as neutral on the issue while the 
remaining members were either for or against 
decriminalization. 
Procedure
After informed consent, participants read a 
paragraph describing the issue of the decrim-
inalization of marijuana. Then participants 
rated their opinion on the issue prior to group
discussion on a scale from 1–9:  1 - I oppose all meas-
ures and tendencies toward the decriminalization 
of marijuana; 5 - I am neutral on the issue; to 9 - 
I support the decriminalization of marijuana. From 
this pre-group opinion, groups were classifi ed 
as majority/minority group, consensus group, or 
neutral-containing group. Pilot testing had found 
that participants (n = 16) rated the topic of the 
decriminalization of marijuana as moderately 
controversial (M = 5.63, SD = 1.15) on a scale 
from 1 - Not at all controversial to 7 - Very controversial) 
and that 63% of the pilot study participants were 
pro-decriminalization and 37% were against. 
 After rating their individual opinion, partici-
pants were given 16 pieces of information about 
the decriminalization of marijuana. Eight of the 
pieces of information were given to all three group 
members. This is the shared information. The 
other eight pieces of information were different 
for each group member. This is the unshared 
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information. What information was used as shared 
and unshared was counterbalanced to prevent 
a confound between the type of information 
and the content of the information. All the 
information had been rated by participants 
in the pilot study for valence and importance. 
Based on the ratings from the pilot study, four 
sets of eight pieces of information were created 
that were fairly equivalent in terms of the rat-
ings. Half of the information, both shared and 
unshared, was pro-decriminalization, and half 
was against decriminalization. Examples of 
pro-decriminalization of marijuana information 
included: ‘Marijuana was decriminalized in 
Holland in 1976. From 1976 to 1984, there was 
no increase in the number of Dutch marijuana 
smokers. (The Nation, September 20, 1999)’ and 
‘A study by the Center for Substance Abuse 
Research has found since the passing of an ini-
tiative in California in 1996 allowing the use of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes, there has not 
been a signifi cant increase in marijuana use’. 
Examples of anti-decriminalization of marijuana 
information are: 
The Alaska Supreme Court ruled in 1975 that the 
state could not interfere with a person’s possession 
of marijuana in his home for personal use. Accord-
ing to a 1988 University of Alaska study, the state’s 
12 to 17-year-olds used marijuana at more than 
twice the national average for their age group. 
Alaska residents voted in 1990 to recriminalize 
possession of marijuana
and ‘Marijuana has been shown to degrade 
short-term memory, concentration, judgment, 
and coordination at complex tasks, including 
driving’. Participants were asked to read through 
their information before meeting in a group 
to discuss it.
 After reading the information, participants 
met in three person groups to discuss the issue. 
Groups were instructed to come to a group 
consensus on the issue and were given a sheet to 
rate the group’s opinion on the same 1–9 scale 
participants had fi lled out before meeting in 
the group. Participants were also told: 
Everyone in the group was given 16 pieces of 
information about the issue before meeting in a 
group. Some of the pieces of information they 
received are identical to some of the information 
you received. However, some of the information 
they received is different from the information 
you received. Therefore, another group member 
may have information that you do not have. You will 
have up to 30 minutes to discuss the information 
as a group. 
The groups were videotaped. The average group 
discussed the issue a little more than 12 minutes. 
After informing the experimenter that the group 
had reached consensus, group members were 
moved to separate rooms and asked to rate each 
of the 32 pieces of information on a scale from 
1–10: 1 - Not important, 5 - Somewhat important, 
and 10 - Very important. 
 The videos of the group discussions were 
transcribed word for word by an experimental 
assistant so that the discussions could be coded. 
There were two stages to the coding. Two coders, 
who were uninvolved in the transcription of 
the discussions, coded the discussions into idea 
units. The coders were instructed to bracket off 
each part of the discussion that constituted one 
idea. An idea unit could constitute a sentence, 
part of a sentence, several sentences, or even 
one word. Guetzkow’s U (1950) was used as a 
measure of unitizing disagreement. Guetzkow’s 
U is computed by subtracting the amount of 
idea units coded by the second coder from the 
amount coded by the fi rst coder and dividing 
this difference by the total amount of idea units 
coded by both of the coders across all discussions. 
The unitizing reliability between the two coders 
was good, U = .005. Any discrepancies between 
the two coders were settled by a master coder. The 
transcripts that were bracketed into idea units 
were then coded by two new coders, who coded 
the transcripts for discussion of information 
from the information sheets given to particip-
ants. Their reliability was good (Cohen’s 
kappa = .73, SE = .02). Again, a master coder 
settled any discrepancies and designated each 
piece of information as common or unique (own 
or other) based on its use in the experiment. 
Results
This study uses Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
(HLM) software version 5.5 for some of the 
analyses because the individuals were nested 
within groups. Individual level one predictor 
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variables were group mean centered and group 
level two predictor variables were grand mean 
centered. Also, when variance was close to zero 
(p > .50) effects were modeled as fi xed (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992; Nezlek, 2001).
HLM examined differences between groups 
in the rating of importance of shared and un-
shared information. There was no difference 
between groups on how participants rated shared 
information (γ 01 = –.007, SE = 0.03, t(41) = 0.28, 
p = .78); or unshared information (γ 01 = .024, 
SE = 0.02, t(41) = 1.018, p = .32). Unshared 
information was further divided into unshared 
information the participant had been given 
(own) and unshared information other group 
members had. There was no difference between 
groups on how participants rated their own 
unshared information (γ 01 = .014, SE = 0.02, t(41) 
= 0.57, p = .57); or other’s unshared information 
(γ 01 = .029, SE = 0.03, t(41) = 1.11, p = .27). For 
aggregate group means, see Table 1.
The mean aggregate group rating of shared 
and unshared information was compared 
in a repeated measures analysis of variance. 
There was no difference between the ratings 
of shared (M = 6.42, SD = 0.67) and unshared 
information (M = 6.50, SD = 0.62) (F(1,40) = 
1.26, η2 = 0.03, p = .27), nor was there an 
interaction with type of group (F(2,40) = 0.34, 
η2 = 0.02, p = .72). Therefore, contrary to what 
the common information sampling bias would 
predict, shared information was not rated as 
more important. However, this was a test of all 
information, both discussed and undiscussed; 
A test of just the information discussed in the 
group is next. 
I compared how participants rated informa-
tion that was mentioned during the discussion 
to information not mentioned. A between-groups 
repeated measures analysis of variance was con-
ducted on the group mean to compare shared 
information that was mentioned to shared 
information not mentioned. A similar analysis 
was conducted for unshared information and 
own information. For all three types of infor-
mation (shared, unshared, and own), there was 
no difference between the rating of importance 
of mentioned information and non-mentioned 
information (F(1,40) = 1.13, η2 = 0.03, p = .29; 
F(1,40) = 1.77, η2 = 0.04, p = .19; F(1,40) = 0.00, 
η2 = 0.00, p = .96, respectively). Further, there 
was no effect of type of group (consensus, 
majority/minority, neutral) for the three 
types of information (F(2,40) = 0.60, η2 = 0.03, 
p = .56; F(2,40) = 0.34, η2 = 0.02, p = .71; F(2,40) 
= 0.54, η2 = 0.03, p = .59, respectively). For means 
see Table 2. It was analyzed if participants rated 
shared information they mentioned higher 
than shared information mentioned by another 
person during discussion (M = 7.31, SD = 1.23). 
A repeated measures analysis of variance be-
tween groups was not signifi cant (F(1,40) = 1.62, 
η2 = 0.04, p = .21), nor was there an effect of group 
(F(2,40) = 0.29, η2 = 0.01, p = .75). However, 
it was analyzed if participants rated shared 
information mentioned only by another person 
as more important than shared information 
not mentioned at all. There was a signifi cant 
effect (F(1,40) = 6.99, η2 = 0.15, p = .01). Shared 
information mentioned by another person was 
rated as more important than shared informa-
tion not mentioned, but there was no interaction 
Table 1. Mean rating of importance of information between groups
 Minority/majority Consensus Neutral-containing
    
 M SD M SD M SD
Shared  6.30 0.63 6.63 0.55 6.44 0.82
Unshared 6.35 0.66 6.68 0.31 6.64 0.70
Own unshared 6.48 0.62 6.73 0.28 6.66 0.78
Other unshared  6.28 0.74 6.65 0.45 6.62 0.70
For individual opinion 6.93 0.69 7.85 0.64 7.14 0.85
Against individual opinion 6.02 0.69 5.52 0.43 6.09 1.17
For group opinion 6.66 0.71 7.85 0.64 7.04 0.49
Against group opinion 6.31 0.72 5.52 0.43 6.34 1.02
247
Van Swol importance of shared and unshared information
with type of group (F(2,40) = 0.22, η2 = 0.01, 
p = .80). In conclusion, contrary to Hypothesis 1, 
participants did not rate information they 
mentioned as more important than information 
not mentioned. However, in partial support of 
Hypothesis 1, shared information that another 
person mentioned was rated as more important 
than shared information not discussed. 
To test Hypothesis 2, a between-groups re-
peated measures analysis of variance compared 
shared information mentioned versus unshared 
information mentioned. There was a marginal 
effect of information (F(1,40) = 3.19, η2 = 0.07, 
p = .08), but no interaction with type of group 
(F(2,40) = 0.03, η2 = 0.00, p = .97). Shared 
information that was mentioned was rated 
as more important than the unshared infor-
mation mentioned. Shared information 
not mentioned was compared to unshared 
information not mentioned in a repeated 
measures analysis of variance between groups. 
There was no signifi cant difference between 
shared and unshared information not men-
tioned (F(1,40) = 0.00, η2 = 0.00, p = .98), 
nor an interaction with type of group (F(2,40) = 
1.54, η2 = 0.07, p = .23). Further, it was analyzed 
how participants rated shared information only 
another mentioned versus unshared information 
mentioned by another. There was a signifi cant 
effect of information, shared information 
another mentioned (M = 7.31, SD = 1.23) 
was rated higher than unshared information 
mentioned by another (M  = 6.36, SD  = 
1.36) (F(1,40) = 11.96, η2 = 0.23, p < .001).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that for information 
that is mentioned, shared information should be 
rated as more important than unshared. For 
the mentioning of participants’ own information, 
this hypothesis was only marginally signifi cant. 
However, shared information was rated as more 
important than unshared for information others 
mentioned. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was partially 
supported. 
 To test Hypothesis 3, the mean aggregate 
group rating of own information (shared and 
own unshared) and other information was 
compared in a repeated measures analysis of 
variance. There was no difference between the 
ratings of own (M = 6.51, SD = 0.58) and other’s 
information (M = 6.46, SD = 0.68), (F(1,40) 
= 0.11, η2 = 0.00, p = .74), nor was there an 
interaction with type of group (F(2,40) = 0.58, 
η2 = 0.03, p = .57). This fails to support the 
ownership bias, Hypothesis 3.
 To test Hypothesis 4, I analyzed how the 
repetition of information affected its rated 
importance. It was examined if participants 
rated shared information that was repeated 
(M = 6.95, SD = 1.41) higher than shared 
information not mentioned. The same analysis 
was conducted for own unshared information 
and for other’s unshared. For all three types 
of information (shared, own unshared, and 
other’s unshared), there was not a signifi cant 
difference between repeated and not mentioned 
information (F(1,16) = 2.67, η2 = 0.14, p = .12; 
F(1,9) = 0.16, η2 = 0.02, p = .70; F(1,10) = 0.77, 
η2 = 0.07, p = .40, respectively). Nor was there 
an effect of type of group (F(2,16) = 1.13, η2 = 
0.12, p = .35; F(2,9) = 2.12, η2 = 0.32, p = .18; 
F(2,10) = 1.54, η2 = 0.24, p = .26, respectively). 
Although, there was an interesting trend for own 
unshared information, in consensus groups 
own unshared information that was repeated 
was rated higher (M = 8.50, SD = 0.71) than in 
minority/majority groups (M = 6.70, SD = 1.86) or 
neutral-containing groups (M = 5.20, SD = 2.59). 
In conclusion, no support was found for 
Hypothesis 4, that the repetition of information 
would increase its perceived importance.
 The next set of analyses tested the confi r-
mation bias. Neutral-containing groups were 
excluded from the following analysis. An an-
alysis of variance on the group mean found that 
participants in consensus groups rated infor-
mation in support of their pre-group opinion as 
more important than participants in minority/
majority groups (F(1,29) = 12.75, η2 = 0.31, 
Table 2. Mean rating of importance of information 
mentioned and not mentioned
   Unshared- 
 Shared Unshared own
   
 M SD M SD M SD 
Mentioned 6.87 1.54 6.13 1.87 6.59 1.14
Not mentioned 6.65 1.07 6.56 0.60 6.63 0.66
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p < .001). Also, the mean rating of information that 
was against the individual’s pre-group opinion 
was examined. Participants in consensus groups 
rated information against their pre-group opinion 
as less important than participants in minority/
majority groups (F(1,29) = 4.46, η2 = 0.13, p < .05). 
A between-groups repeated measures analysis of 
variance comparing information for and against 
the individual opinion was conducted using the 
group aggregate. There was a signifi cant effect 
of information (F(1,29) = 135.04, η2 = 0.82, 
p < .0001). Participants were much more likely 
to rate information for their individual opinion 
as more important than information against 
it. This supports Hypothesis 5a. However, this 
was qualifi ed by a signifi cant interaction with 
group (F(1,29) = 26.09, η2 = 0.47, p < .0001). 
Each group was analyzed separately, and it was 
found that individuals in minority/majority 
groups and consensus groups (F(1,20) = 42.70, 
η2 = 0.68, p < .0001; F(1,9) = 68.32, η2 = 0.88, 
p < .0001, respectively) both rated information 
for their individual opinion as more important 
than information against their opinion, but the 
effect size for consensus groups was larger. There-
fore, participants in consensus groups were 
more likely to have a confi rmation bias toward 
information supporting their opinion than 
participants in minority/majority groups, in 
support of Hypothesis 5b.
 Analyses also examined the presence of a con-
fi rmation bias toward the group opinion. Five 
groups whose position was neutral were excluded 
from the following analysis. An analysis of vari-
ance between groups was conducted on how 
individuals rated information for the group 
position. There was a signifi cant effect (F(2,35) = 
11.05, η2 = 0.39, p < .0001). Post hoc Scheffé tests 
revealed that consensus groups were signifi -
cantly more likely to rate information for the 
group’s position as more important than either 
the minority/majority groups (mean difference = 
1.19, SE = 0.25, p < .0001) or neutral-containing 
groups (mean difference = 0.81, SE = 0.29, p < .05). 
However, minority/majority groups and neutral-
containing groups did not signifi cantly differ 
(mean difference = 0.38, SE = 0.25, p = .33). A 
similar analysis was conducted on rated import-
ance of information against the group opinion. 
There was a signifi cant effect (F(2,35) = 4.21, 
η2 = 0.19, p < .05). Post hoc Scheffé tests revealed 
that consensus groups rated information 
against the group opinion as signifi cantly less 
important than minority/majority groups (mean 
difference = 0.79, SE = 0.30, p < .05). However, 
consensus groups did not signifi cantly differ 
from neutral-containing groups (mean difference 
= 0.83, SE = 0.34, p = .06) and minority/majority 
groups and neutral-containing groups did 
not signifi cantly differ (mean difference = 0.04, 
SE = 0.30, p = .99). A repeated measures analysis 
of variance comparing information for and 
against the group opinion was conducted using 
the group aggregate. There was a signifi cant 
effect of information (F(1,35) = 70.50, η2 = 0.67, 
p < .0001). Participants were much more likely to 
rate information for the group opinion as more 
important than information against it. However, 
this was qualifi ed by a signifi cant interaction with 
group (F(2,35) = 20.52, η2 = 0.54, p < .0001). Each 
group was analyzed separately, and it was found 
that individuals in minority/majority groups 
(F(1,35) = 3.83, η2 = 0.18, p = .07) did not rate 
information for and against the group position 
signifi cantly different, but participants in con-
sensus groups and neutral-containing groups 
did (F(2,35) = 68.32, η2 = 0.88, p < .0001, F(2,35) = 
8.66, η2 = 0.49, p < .05). In conclusion, consensus 
groups had more of a confi rmation bias towards 
information supporting the group’s opinion.
Minority/majority groups 
In the minority-containing groups, there were 
six groups in which the minority opinion pre-
vailed as the group opinion. Half of these 
groups were pro-decriminalization and half 
were against. HLM analysis was conducted to 
examine whether or not the minority prevailed 
as a level 2 group variable and type of member 
(minority or majority) as a level 1 individual 
variable. HLM analysis showed that minorities 
(M = 6.74, SD = 0.71) rated shared information 
as more important than majority members 
(M = 6.08, SD = 1.04) (γ10 = –.33, SE = 0.119, t(19) 
= –3.07, p < .01; and there was no interaction 
with whether the minority prevailed (γ11 = .27, 
SE = 0.20, t(19) = 1.32, p = .20). For unshared 
information that was given to participants (own 
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unshared), minorities (M = 6.71, SD = 1.14) 
did not significantly differ from majorities 
(M = 6.37, SD = 1.02) (γ10 = –.17, SE = 0.14, t(19) = 
–1.16, p = .26), and there was no interaction with 
whether or not the minority opinion prevailed as 
the group opinion (γ11 = –.09, SE = 0.32, t(19) = 
–0.27, p = .79). For other’s unshared information, 
effects were modeled as fi xed for the slope due 
to very low variance (p > .50). Groups in 
which the minority prevailed (M = 5.81, SD = 
1.29) rated other’s unshared information as 
marginally less important than groups in which 
the majority prevailed (M = 6.47, SD = 1.00), 
(γ01 = –.65, SE = 0.33, t(19) = –1.95, p = .07). 
Further, minorities (M = 6.62, SD = 1.00) rated 
other’s unshared information as marginally 
more important than majorities did (M = 6.11, 
SD = 1.14), (γ10 = –.25, SE = 0.13, t(59) = –1.88, 
p = .07), but there was no interaction with 
whether or not the minority opinion prevailed 
as the group opinion (γ11 = .17, SE = 0.30, t(59) = 
0.57, p = .57).
HLM analysis examined the rating of import-
ance of information supporting the individual 
participant’s opinion. Individuals in groups 
in which the minority prevailed (M = 6.40, 
SD = 1.20) rated information for their individual 
position as less important than participants in 
groups in which the majority prevailed (M = 7.14, 
SD = 0.97) (γ01 = –.75, SE = 0.29, t(19) = –2.54, 
p < .05). There was no signifi cant effect of type 
of member (γ10 = –.22, SE = 0.14, t(19) = –1.59, 
p = .13), or interaction with whether or not the 
minority opinion prevailed as the group opin-
ion (γ11 = –.10, SE = 0.30, t(19) = –0.34, p = .74). 
For information against the individual’s opin-
ion, effects for the slope were modeled as fi xed 
because variance was close to zero. There was no 
effect of whether or not the minority opinion 
prevailed as the group opinion (γ01 = –.41, 
SE = 0.33, t(19) = –1.24, p = .23). Minorities 
(M = 6.37, SD = 1.06) rated information against 
their individual opinion as more important 
than majority members (M = 5.85, SD = 1.06) 
(γ10 = –.26, SE = 0.13, t(59) = –1.97, p = .05), and 
there was no interaction with whether or not the 
minority opinion prevailed as the group opinion 
(γ11 = .34, SE = 0.29, t(59) = 1.17, p = .25). 
 A repeated measures analysis of variance 
examined how minority and majority members 
rated shared information that they mentioned 
during the discussion versus shared informa-
tion that was not mentioned. There was a sig-
nifi cant interaction (F(1,26) = 5.79, η2 = 0.18, 
p < .05). Minorities rated shared information 
they mentioned (M = 6.17, SD = 2.50) lower than 
information they did not mention (M = 7.30, 
SD = 1.41), whereas majority members rated 
shared information they mentioned as higher 
(M = 7.02, SD = 1.51) than shared information they 
did not mention (M = 6.43, SD = 1.18). A similar 
analysis was conducted on participants’ own 
information. There was a marginally signifi cant 
interaction (F(1,35) = 3.03, η2 = 0.08, p = .09). 
Minorities rated their own information that they 
mentioned (M = 6.24, SD = 1.57) lower than 
their own information that they did not mention 
(M = 6.92, SD = 0.93), whereas majority members 
rated their own information they mentioned as 
higher (M = 6.61, SD = 1.25) than information 
they did not mention (M = 6.47, SD = 0.79). For 
review of the major results, see Table 3.
Discussion
In sum, participants did not rate information 
they mentioned as more important than in-
formation they did not mention, contrary to 
Hypothesis 1. However, Hypothesis 1 did re-
ceive some support in that participants rated 
shared information another person mentioned 
as more important than shared information 
not mentioned. Hypothesis 2 predicted that 
shared information discussed would be rated 
as more important than unshared information 
discussed. This bias for shared information 
was marginally significant for information 
participants themselves mentioned, but it was 
signifi cant for information others mentioned. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 received partial sup-
port. For information not mentioned, there 
was no bias toward rating shared information 
as more important than unshared information. 
Further, there were no differences between the 
types of groups in the rating of shared and 
unshared information. Participants did not have 
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an ownership bias toward rating information they 
received before the group discussion as more 
important than other’s unshared information, 
so Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Further, 
participants did not rate information that was 
repeated as more important, so Hypothesis 4 
was not supported. In support of Hypothesis 
5a, participants did have a confi rmation bias 
toward information that supported their 
opinion, but in support of Hypothesis 5b, the 
presence of an opinion minority in the group 
lessened this confi rmation bias. Groups also 
had a confi rmation bias toward information 
supporting the group opinion. Finally, within 
minority-containing groups, minority and 
majority members were compared. Minorities 
tended to rate information as more important 
than majorities, with the exception of their own 
unshared. Also, minorities rated information 
against their opinion as more important 
than majorities. Further, minorities rated 
shared information they mentioned as less 
important than shared information they did 
not mention. 
Bias for shared information
Chernyshenko et al. (2003) stated that the 
bias for shared information does not occur for 
information that is not discussed in the group. 
My results support this; For the information 
that was not discussed, shared and unshared 
information was rated about equally important. 
However, for the information that was discussed, 
it was predicted that shared information would 
be rated as more important than unshared due to 
mutual enhancement and the positive response 
that shared information would receive when 
mentioned. This bias for shared information 
was only signifi cant for information that other 
group members mentioned, but for information 
group members themselves mentioned, it was 
only marginally signifi cant. This difference was 
mainly due to the shared information that others 
mentioned being rated higher than shared in-
formation members mentioned themselves. It 
is possible that mutual enhancement is stronger 
for shared information another person mentions 
than shared information a group member them-
selves mentions. When a group member mentions 
a piece of shared information, they may or may 
not receive validation from other group members. 
Therefore, the group member may not always 
realize that the information is shared among 
the group. However, when a group member hears 
another group member mention a piece of 
shared information, they know that this piece 
of information matches their own information 
and validates what they know. So, even if the 
group member remains silent when they hear 
another member mention a piece of shared 
information, hearing the shared information 
mentioned is still validating. However, having 
shared information validated when one mentions 
it requires another group member to engage 
in some verbal or nonverbal action affi rming 
the information. Chernyshenko et al. (2003) 
Table 3. Highlight of important signifi cant results
Description ANOVA statistics
Shared information mentioned only by another person rated as more F(1,40) = 6.99, η2 = 0.15, p = .01
 important than shared information not mentioned at all.  
Shared information that was mentioned rated as marginally more F(1,40) = 3.19, η2 = 0.07, p = .08
 important than the unshared information mentioned. 
Shared information only another mentioned rated more important F(1,40) = 11.96, η2 = 0.23, p < .001
 than unshared information mentioned only by another. 
Participants in consensus groups rated information in support of  F(1,29) = 12.75, η2 = 0.31, p < .001
 pre-group opinion as more important than participants in minority/
 majority groups. 
Participants in consensus groups rated information against pre-group  F(1,29) = 4.46, η2 = 0.13, p < .05
 opinion as less important than participants in minority/majority groups.
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had predicted that ‘self-contributed common 
(shared) cues would be more important’ than 
other-contributed shared cues (p. 23), but they 
were unable to test this in their study. However, 
my results suggest the opposite. The idea that 
hearing shared information mentioned by others 
is more mutually enhancing and validating than 
mentioning the shared information oneself is an 
interesting idea that deserves further testing.
Ownership bias
 Contrary to previous research (Chernyshenko 
et al., 2003; Van Swol et al., 2003), I found no 
support for the ownership bias. Participants 
did not rate information they received before 
the group discussion as more important than 
other’s unshared information. The information 
given to participants was all factual. None of the 
information was fabricated, and often sources 
for the piece of information were given. For 
example, a piece of information would be attri-
buted to the ‘Offi ce of National Drug Control 
Policy’ or a ‘RAND institute study’. One reason 
participants may have an ownership bias to-
ward their information is that they can verify 
their own information, but may question the 
validity of information received from another 
person. However, because all the information 
participants received in this experiment cited 
the source of the information, they may have 
been less likely to doubt the validity of new 
information. Therefore, when participants were 
rating the information after the group discussion, 
all the information probably appeared true and 
valid, and it may not have mattered whether the 
participants had been given the information 
before the group discussion or not. Results in 
support of the confi rmation bias suggest that 
it was much more important to participants 
whether the information supported their 
opinion than whether it was given to them by 
the experimenter. Because the topic was one in 
which most participants came to the experiment 
with pre-existing viewpoints, they may have been 
open to any information, as long as it supported 
their views. 
However, the ownership bias could play a 
role in other processes underlying the bias 
for shared information. The ownership bias 
could underlie some of the effects of mutual 
enhancement. Because participants have bias 
toward their own information, they may react 
positively toward another group member who 
mentions their information (Wittenbaum, 
et al., 1999). 
Reiteration effect
Contrary to Hypothesis 4, information that 
was repeated was not rated as more important. 
One problem is that there was not a lot of repe-
tition of information. Only about a quarter 
of the group members repeated any of the 
information, so the sample size was small. For 
shared information, there was a trend toward 
rating repeated information as more import-
ant, but it failed to reach signifi cance. Further, 
in all but a few cases, the participant only re-
peated the piece of information once. Van 
Swol et al. (2003) found that the repetition of 
shared information prevented individuals from 
uncovering hidden profi les, but participants in 
their repetition condition had all the shared 
information repeated twice. Further, in Van 
Swol et al. (2003) participants did not engage 
in a group discussion, but simply received the 
information in written format. Therefore, the 
repetition was more salient in Van Swol et al. 
(2003). In the present experiment, there might 
be considerable discussion before the informa-
tion was repeated. 
Also, previous research examining the 
effects of repetition has used information 
in which participants have few indicators of 
the information’s validity (Alba et al., 1980; 
Van Swol et al., 2003). Amount of repetition 
may be the only clue participants can use to 
determine if a piece of information is im-
portant or valid. However, the information 
in this experiment was factual and often gave 
participants information about the piece 
of information’s source. Therefore, partici-
pants had other clues, besides the amount 
of repetition, on which to judge a piece of infor-
mation, and it is likely that these other clues 
were more salient. There may not have been 
any effect of repetition because participants only 
use repetition to judge a piece of information 
when other indicators are not available.
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Confi rmation bias
 In support of Hypothesis 5a and much previous 
research, participants rated information sup-
porting their position as more important than 
information contrary to their position. Greitemeyer 
and Schulz-Hardt (2003) stressed the importance 
of identifying ‘conditions under which group 
members are better able to conduct an unbiased 
assessment of the information available to 
them’ (p. 337). In support of Hypothesis 5b, I 
found that this confi rmation bias was lessened in 
groups containing a minority opinion. The 
presence of a minority may encourage people 
to consider multiple viewpoints and engage 
in divergent thinking (De Dreu & De Vries, 
1996; Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth & Rogers, 1996). 
Therefore, in groups containing a minority, 
group members may have been more open to 
information contrary to their opinion. Schulz-
Hardt et al. (2002) found that the presence of 
an opinion minority lowered group confi dence, 
as members may come to question their opinion 
in the light of dissent. This lower confi dence 
may make group members more open to 
information contrary to their viewpoint because 
group members are more willing to consider 
that their viewpoint may not be ideal.
 Another possibility for the reduced confi rma-
tion bias is that groups containing an opinion 
minority develop different norms than con-
sensus groups. Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir 
(2001) investigated groups with norms for 
consensus and norms for critical thought. 
They found that groups with norms for critical 
thought were more open than consensus norm 
groups to new information that challenged 
many of the group members’ pre-group opinions. 
Although Postmes et al. (2001) manipulated 
group norms through prior group experience, 
it is possible that the presence of a dissenting 
opinion minority could decrease the presence 
of consensus norms within a group and promote 
more critical thought. However, group norms 
were not measured in the present study, nor was 
confi dence in the group. Therefore, I am unable 
to study why the presence of an opinion minority 
lowered the confi rmation bias. However, these 
potential explanations offer a fruitful area for 
future research.
Minority versus majority members
Finally, in groups containing an opinion minority, 
the minority was compared to the majority 
group members. Minorities were more open to 
other’s unshared information and information 
not supporting their opinion than the majority 
members. Minorities rated other’s unshared 
information and information against their 
opinion as more important than the majority 
members did. Further, they were more open 
to information supporting the group opinion 
when they did not prevail. Minority members 
may have considered other’s information and 
information against their opinion as more 
important than the majority members did 
because of lower confi dence. Learning that 
they are the minority opinion in the group may 
make minority members second guess their 
opinion and lower their confi dence in their 
views. Schultz-Hardt et al. (2002) state that 
learning that others chose another alternative 
may signal to a group member that he or she is 
incorrect. Participants with high confi dence 
may not seek out additional information be-
cause their confi dence is suffi ciently high that 
they do not think their decisions have to be 
evaluated any more. However, a member with 
lower confi dence may be more open to new 
information, as they evaluate more alternatives 
or seek additional information to bolster their 
confi dence. Therefore, upon learning that most 
people disagree with them, minority members 
may become less confi dent and more willing 
to ascribe importance to information from 
other members and information against their 
opinion. Minority members also rated shared 
information they mentioned as less important 
than majority members. Because of their pos-
ition, minority members may receive less social 
validation when they mention information than 
majority members. Therefore, because the 
information they mention is not received as well, 
it might have diminished importance. 
Future research
This study examined how individuals perceived 
the importance of information after a group 
discussion. Future research should examine 
some of the variables that may mediate the 
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results found in this paper. For example, it 
was proposed that confi dence or group norms 
may mediate the lowered confi rmation bias in 
minority-containing groups. Neither of these was 
measured, but they are interesting variables to 
pursue in further research. Also, future research 
may want to examine if minority members 
receive less social validation during the group 
discussion and if this is related to the lowered 
importance minority members attribute to the 
information they mention.
 Other research should use group sizes larger 
than three. A minority of one may be less effective 
at lessening the confi rmation bias in larger 
groups, or a minority of two or more group 
members in a larger group may have a stronger 
effect. Further, as the group size increases, a 
larger number of group members have the 
shared information, and therefore, it should 
receive more validation, increasing its importance 
compared to unshared information. Finally, 
researchers may want to examine the differences 
in mutual enhancement when one mentions 
shared information oneself versus when another 
group member mentions the shared information. 
Is hearing another mention shared information 
more validating, as my results suggested?
 In conclusion, this study aimed to understand 
individual level processes that may underlie 
the bias groups have for shared information. 
Specifi cally, I examined several variables that 
could affect the perceived importance of shared 
information after a group discussion. I found 
that shared information other group members 
mentioned and information confi rming one’s 
view was rated as more important. This suggests 
that shared information would be rated as espe-
cially important in hidden profi le type situations, 
where the shared information supports group 
member’s initial decision. Further, shared in-
formation may dominate in the group because 
group members hear other members mentioning 
it. I did not fi nd that repetition or ownership of 
information increases its importance. However, 
this is the fi rst study examining the common 
information bias and investigating ownership and 
repetition of information that has tracked the 
discussion of information to its rated importance. 
The failure of these variables to affect the rated 
importance of information in this study should 
not exclude them from future research. Finally, 
the presence of a minority proved to be an 
important variable. The presence of a minority 
member decreased the confi rmation bias, and 
minority members rated information against 
their individual viewpoint and other’s unshared 
information as more important, suggesting 
that minority members may be more open to 
additional information. Further, minorities 
actually rated information they mentioned as 
less important than information they did not 
mention, suggesting that their information 
may not have been well received in the group. 
These results suggest that, in addition to group 
processes in information exchange, researchers 
should pay attention to how individual’s 
perception of the information changes as a 
result of how the information is discussed by 
the group.
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